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Abstract
The study of popular support for authoritarian regimes, and the comparative study of political
attitudes, has long relied on the assumption that survey respondents provide truthful answers on
surveys. However, when measuring regime support in closed political systems there is a distinct risk
that individuals are less than forthright due to fear that their opinions may be made known to the
public or the authorities. In order to test this assumption, we conducted a novel web-based survey
in China in which we included four list experiments of commonly used items in the comparative
literature on regime support. We find systematic bias for all four measures as a result of self-
censorship; substantially more individuals state that they support the regime with direct questioning
than do when presented with our anonymous, indirect list experiments. The level of self-censorship,
which ranges from 16 to 22 percentage points, is considerably higher than previously thought. Self-
censorship is further most prevalent among the wealthy, urban, female and younger respondents.
These findings indicate that prior studies that have found high levels of support for the Chinese
regime using these particular measures likely overestimate the true level of support. Further, cross-
national studies which compare popular support across regime type may be systematically biased if
responses are not subject to the same level of falsification across regime types.
The most elegant way to adjust to censorship is to engage in self-censorship. It is the
perfect method for allying with power and setting the stage for mutual exchange of benefit.
-Ai Weiwei
1 Introduction
In an extraordinary display of public cohesion, as high as 98% of Chinese survey respondents reported
that they had trust in four of the core political institutions at the national level: the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), the national government, the People’s Liberation Army and the National
People’s Congress (Chu et al., 2008). Moreover, in 2003 94% of respondents stated that “Our form
of government is best for us” (Nathan, 2007); and in 2014 president Xi Jinping received the highest
approval rating of 30 world leaders (Putin was the runner-up) (Saich, 2014). Compared to almost
any country1, and certainly relative to any established democracy, these are staggering numbers.
But are these expressions of regime support reflective of sincere beliefs?
Given the CCP’s consolidation of the national territory and record of economic growth that has
lifted people out of poverty at an unprecedented pace (UNDP, 2016), and the regime’s focus on
good governance and the provision of public goods (Dickson et al., 2016), high support is argued to
be a reflection of citizen approval (Holbig and Gilley, 2010; Wang, 2005; Dickson, 2016). Moreover,
it has been argued that cultural values in favor of hierarchy and the collective makes the Chinese
population predisposed to accept political authority uncritically (Shi, 2008).
It is likely the case that the regime enjoys some level of popular support - it is hard to imagine its
survival for such a long period of time without. But there is the distinct possibility that at least part
of the explanation to these extraordinary figures lies in the unwillingness of individuals to criticize the
regime. China is a one-party state with both the capacity and audacity to carry out mass surveillance,
repression, and to root out dissent (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011).
Foreign technology firms such as Google and Facebook that have not agreed to provide user data to
the government upon request have been banned from operation (MacKinnon, 2008), and activists,
lawyers, and publishers are known to disappear (International, 2016). Perhaps surprising given
these concerns, the study of self-censorship in survey data in authoritarian regimes has received
little scholarly attention. There are a few notable contributions to this area of research from Russia,
China, and a comparative study of African regime types, (cf. Kalinin (2016); Frye et al. (2017);
Jiang and Yang (2016) and Tannenberg (2017)), however results have been somewhat inconclusive.
In the Chinese context, two recent studies claim to challenge the notion that political wariness, or
fear, bias survey results on politically sensitive questions (Lei and Lu, 2017; Stockmann, Esarey and
Zhang, 2017). But both of these studies focus in some respect on whether or not individuals react
di↵erently to the party (or party members) compared to a purported neutral alternative, not on
self-censorship itself. Indeed, Stockmann, Esarey and Zhang (2017) stress that we cannot exclude
1Notable exceptions are Vietnam (AsianBarometer, 2008) and Russia (Frye et al., 2017; Kalinin, 2016)
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the possibility that other sources of bias than political fear distort survey results. As such, it is still
unclear if and to what extent Chinese survey respondents self-censor their level of regime support
on survey items.
In order to determine if self-censorship is present in Chinese survey data, we conducted an
online survey experiment in mainland China. We employ four list experiments to test respondents’
support for four potentially politically sensitive propositions: confidence in the national government;
belief in the sincerity of an ongoing anti-corruption campaign; preference for the existing system of
government; and support for government censorship. The list experiment design works such that
respondents’ preferences with regards to the sensitive items cannot be traced to an individual while
at the same time allowing for estimates of preference for the item at the aggregate level. By providing
individual respondents anonymity, we assume that responses from the list experiment technique are
more representative of true levels of support than are direct responses. Indeed, list experiments
in other contexts have been shown to provide larger estimates of socially undesirable attitudes or
behavior (such as prejudice, non-voting, or illicit drug use) than standard, direct techniques (Glynn,
2013) 2. Estimates from the list experiments are then contrasted to estimates based on direct
questions to gauge the extent of self-censorship for each of the four items.
Self-censorship can be di↵erentiated into two distinct methods of hiding one’s preferences. The
first method is non-response; respondents can simply skip the sensitive survey item, or provide
a neutral response. While there are several studies on China that try to infer the sensitivity of a
particular survey item by analyzing non- and neutral response (see Lei and Lu, 2017), it is inherently
di cult to distinguish between self-censorship and true neutrality. The second method with which
one can self-censor is to give a false response - in this case, to state that one supports the regime to
a greater extent than one’s true belief. The primary focus of a list experiment, and therefore this
study, is to estimate the extent of the latter. However, by providing individuals the opportunity to
respond anonymously, the propensity to non-respond decreases as well. In fact, non-response to our
list items is much less extensive than in the corresponding direct questions, and is comparable in
extent to that found in demographic questions such as age, gender, or ethnicity.
The four items we study pertain to political support in the broad sense. We conceptualize political
support through the lens of political trust in following Easton (1965)’s seminal work. Easton (1965)
di↵erentiates between di↵use support which pertains to the long-standing institutions of the regime,
and specific support which pertains to short-term aspects such as actors and particular policies.
Our study is designed such that two sensitive items are intended to evaluate di↵use support and two
items specific support. Item one pertains to specific support and is a classic survey question which
evaluates confidence in the current central government. The second item probes for respondents’
perception of a Xi Jinping’s flagship anti-corruption campaign that he launched immediately after
having assumed o ce, which resulted in 1.16 million corruption charges filed against o cials and has
punished 1.2 million out of the party’s 88 million members for disciplinary violations (China Daily,
2A list experiment does however not incentivize truthful responses, it simply removes the risk that one’s preferences
can be made known.
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2017). In addition to the campaign being closely tied to the current top leadership, it is contested if
it represents a sincere e↵ort to root out corruption or simply functions as a tool for the elimination
of rival factions (for a discussion see (Lam, 2015))3. The item thus functions as a second evaluation
of specific support, and support for Xi Jinping in particular.
The third item falls onto di↵use support as it is evaluative of the political regime as a whole,
specifically, to what extent an individual believes the current system is best4. The fourth item probes
for support for a specific institution, namely government censorship. Similar to our third item, we
argue that censorship is representative of the di↵use support given that it is such a defining feature of
CCP rule. Further, while direction may come from the central government, implementation is done
at all levels, and even by private companies which operate in China. Moreover, control (freedom) of
the flow of information is a central feature of authoritarian (democratic) politics that warrants its
inclusion as a measure of institutional support for authoritarian rule.
In contrast to Stockmann, Esarey and Zhang (2017) and Lei and Lu (2017) studies, our findings
indicate that self-censorship is in fact widespread for all four of our sensitive items and considerably
higher than previously assumed. The di↵erences between estimates using indirect questioning (list
experiment) and those from direct questions are significant and substantial, ranging from 16 to 22
percentage points. Our findings add new insights into public opinion and self-censorship in China
and in autocracies in general, and calls into question the comparative use of political survey items
that may di↵er in sensitivity across contexts.
The article proceeds as follows. First we discuss theories of self-censorship in authoritarian
countries as well as how previous research in China has viewed this source of bias in Section 2. We
then describe our sample in Section 3, followed by a detailed discussion of our estimation strategy
using the list design in Section 4. In Section 5 we present our results including estimation of the
individual characteristics that predict self-censorship before we present our conclusions in Section
6.
2 Self-censorship in authoritarian settings
In all political contexts there is an ever-present risk that survey respondents censor themselves
when answering questions that are invasive into private matters (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). As
a result, survey questions relating to income (Chung and Monroe, 2003), voter turnout (Holbrook
and Krosnick, 2010), prejudice against other ethnic or religious groups (Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens,
1997), and drug abuse or other illegal activities (Krumpal, 2013) have all been shown to be subject
to self-censorship for reasons of prestige, fear of social sanction from peers for deviation from a
3While the latter is the popular narrative in the media, recent scholarly work have argued that the campaign has
significantly reduced bureaucratic opportunities for graft (Manion, 2016; Wedeman, 2017) and shown that geographi-
cally intense social media posts relating to corruption does predict corruption probes (Qin, Stro¨mberg and Wu, 2017)
indicating that the campaign is more than a tool in factional politics.
4By regime we refer to a particular form of government or type of political system, and not to the incumbent
government, although in the case of China these might be hard to distinguish
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perceived social norm, or fear of punishment from the authorities. This poses a serious problem for
the study of such topics because it can lead to systematic non-responses, “don’t knows”, or false
answers, all of which distort the quality of the data.
Most pertinent to survey data from authoritarian states is the potential for bias stemming from
political fear. Kuran (1997) argues that citizens living in authoritarian regimes have strong incentives
to hide their true political preferences - to exercise “preference falsification” - in public simply to stay
safe. Criticism of - or even failing to show explicit support for - the regime can provoke repercussions
in the form of infringement on personal life, economic exclusion or outright physical repression. With
reference to communist Czechoslovakia, Havel (1989: 37) describes a society of veiled preferences in
which people control and censor themselves creating a system in which everyone is “both a victim
and a supporter”, resulting in a situation where rulers and ruled are “living a lie”. Because of this
risk for self-censorship, there are concerns for the feasibility of obtaining reliable estimates of regime
support in authoritarian regimes through the use of public-opinion surveys (Schedler, 1999). This is
especially true for questions that demonstrates respondents’ compliance with the regime. If there is
little or no benefit to the respondents in giving their honest answer, respondents should more likely
to self-censor (Corstange, 2009).
However, political fear is not the only explanation as to why self-censorship may exist in the
context of an authoritarian regime. Such high levels of explicit support may be a result of social
desirability bias in the classic sense of conforming to what one believes to be a social norm. Potential
social repercussions may prevent an individual from free expression of regime criticism if they believe
that others in their social setting hold regime friendly views, and will socially sanction one for
nonconformity (Frye et al., 2017). In this sense, falsely stating regime support in China could be
comparable to falsely reporting that one has voted in a democracy.
Research in China and other authoritarian countries has long argued that survey responses are
not subject to self-censorship (see Wang, 2006; Kennedy, 2009; Geddes and Zaller, 1989). The justifi-
cation for this assumption is based on the observation that individuals do express critical viewpoints
during qualitative interviews (Li, 2004), or that trust in government only weakly correlates with
fear of being reported to the authorities (Shi, 2001; Chen and Shi, 2001), or quite simply because
enumerators believed respondents to have expressed sincere beliefs (Geddes and Zaller, 1989). How-
ever, these arguments are not unproblematic. For instance, Li (2004) finds that rural (his sample
does not include any urban residents) Chinese do criticize the regime, but that it is often directed
at local governments, not the center. Criticism that does arise of the center is primarily aimed at its
ability to implement its desired policies, not its intentions, which villagers often deem to be benign.
Further, to study the correlation between a measure of political fear and political trust as is done
in Shi (2001) and Chen and Shi (2001) is potentially problematic because political fear may itself
be sensitive 5. Moreover, while we highlight two possible reasons why individuals may self-censor -
preference falsification and social desirability bias - this empirical test, whether it is reliable or not,
5The question reads, “If you criticized the party and state leaders in conversations where you live or work, would
you be concerned that someone would report you to the authorities?”
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can only rule out one of these pathways.
Recently, researchers have begun to question the assumption of truthful response and subject
it to empirical scrutiny, but the findings remain inconclusive. Research on Russia has found that
voters over-report their electoral support for President Putin (Kalinin, 2016) but that opinion polls
nevertheless reflect actual approval for the president (Frye et al., 2017). Tannenberg (2017) finds
using Afrobarometer data that respondents in more autocratic countries systematically report more
positive views of citizen-state relations when they believe that a survey was commissioned by the
government rather than by an independent organization.
In the Chinese context some creative research designs have been used to test for the existence of
self-censorship. Specifically, Jiang and Yang (2016) find that responses to politically sensitive and
insensitive survey items diverged around the time of a political purge in Shanghai. But they also
find that these e↵ects were short-lived - responses to the sensitive and insensitive items converged
again roughly 3 weeks after the initial purge. While their results show that self-censorship obviously
increased in this period, it is unclear if baseline (that is, non-purge a↵ected) survey responses are
also plagued by self-censorship. Lei and Lu (2017) - in contrast to Tannenberg (2017) - show that
there is little di↵erence in survey responses if the enumerator conveys cues of a liation with the CCP
in an experimental study in Sichuan province. This design nevertheless leaves open the possibility
that individuals self-censor regardless of enumerator a liation - the control group was defined as
those for “which face-to-face surveys were administered following the standard procedure endorsed
by Chinas academic survey industry”. That is, the control group received an enumerator a liated
with a university. But as (Jiang and Yang, 2016) point out, local government o cials are often used
in large survey projects to dismiss concerns among citizens that university-a liated survey teams
lack credibility6. And finally, (Stockmann, Esarey and Zhang, 2017) study how a↵ect transfer relates
to the likelihood of expressing support for the national government, not self-censorship in itself.
While these studies all provide valuable contributions to the literature on self-censorship, they
leave unanswered the fundamental question as to if and what proportion of Chinese respondents self-
censor responses of regime support in a standard, academic survey setting. Our experimental study
contributes to this prior work through the introduction of a strong design for the measurement of
self-censorship employed to a considerably larger and more geographically diverse sample. Further,
we test this proposition with four survey items which map onto two distinct forms of regime support
- all of which are common survey items in the comparative literature.
6As to whether or not our study could potentially lack credibility such that respondents would view the aims
as suspect, it should be noted that we collaborated with a local market research firm with which respondents have
pre-registered. As initial contact to the survey was made by the market research firm and respondents subsequently
opt-in to the survey, concerns of credibility should be lower than if an unsolicited enumerator were to contact one at
home.
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2.1 Eliciting truthful responses in authoritarian settings
One of the most commonly used techniques to allow the researcher to elicit truthful information
about sensitive issues is the list experiment (also called Item Count Technique). Political scientists
have employed the technique to study sensitive topics such as: race relations (Kuklinski, Cobb and
Gilens, 1997); corruption; (Gingerich et al., 2016); vote turnout (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010);
vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012); electoral rights (Corstange, 2009); opposition violence
(Weghorst, 2011); electoral support (Kalinin, 2016); and approval ratings of autocratic leaders (Frye
et al., 2017). List experiments allows respondents to hide their true opinion on a sensitive topic
by asking them to indicate the number of items on a list of propositions with which they agree
or oppose (Frye et al., 2017), activities in which they engage (Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens, 1997;
Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010), or things that upset them (Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens, 1997). By
asking respondents how many of the items apply to them, instead of which particular items apply
to them, respondents can indicate their true opinion on the sensitive topic while retaining ambiguity
over their specific opinion on any one given item. Thus, neither the researcher, enumerator, or any
other person that may obtain the raw data can identify the specific preference of the respondent, who
is therefore expected to feel comfortable to indicate her true opinion with regards to the sensitive
item.
In our application, the level of self-censorship can be understood as the di↵erence in the propor-
tion of “regime friendly” responses with direct questioning and the list experiment; where respon-
dents perception of anonymity is not guaranteed to when it is guaranteed (under certain conditions).
That is, the di↵erence between support for a sensitive item when asked about it in a typical, direct
survey fashion versus indirectly in the context of a list. The viability of the list experiment for the
study of socially sensitive topics has been shown in the works of Corstange (2009); Glynn (2013)
and Imai (2011), however it is faced with limitations due to its inherent ine ciency and di culties
associated with uncovering individual characteristics which correlate with the sensitive item (Glynn,
2013). Furthermore, its assumption of strict anonymity can be violated through both ceiling and
floor e↵ects. The first is an instance when all of the items on a list applies to a respondent and the
latter when none of the items apply. The risks associated with these violations can be reduced by
increasing the number of items on the list (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010) and/or including items
that are expected to be negatively correlated (Glynn, 2013). When these assumptions hold, the
technique provides valid estimates of true support for sensitive items.
3 The Sample
The data for the study was collected via a novel web-based survey conducted in Mainland China.
A large market research firm in China was contracted to recruit a random sample of respondents
from their panel of over 2 million users. Respondents were invited to partake in a short survey on
political attitudes and were o↵ered a nominal reward for their participation (6 yuan, approximately
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$0.85). Invites were sent out via email and the survey was both mobile and computer compatible.
Those that agreed to participate were directed to a Qualtrics account registered to the researchers.
Participants were informed before beginning the survey that the study was being conducted by an
independent, foreign research university, with a text including the name and logo of the university,
as well as an introduction to the responsible researcher with corresponding contact information.
As a quality check we included two control questions in the survey, one in the middle prior to the
presentation of the lists and one at the end, to ensure that participants were not simply selecting
responses at random7. A total of 2463 participants entered the survey which resulted in a sample
of 1953 after removing those that did not finish or failed one of the quality checks (for a completion
rate of 79%). 10,000 invites were initially distributed but the data collection was stopped once
we reached 1900 complete responses. The response rate of the survey is therefore unknowable as
non-participants among the full sample of invitees represent both those that chose not to complete
the survey and those that were slower to respond to the email invitation.
A web-based sample is naturally unrepresentative of the general population with a higher propor-
tion of young, educated, urban and wealthy individuals, particularly in a developing country where
far from all can a↵ord access to the Internet. At the time of fielding the survey, China had 731
million Internet users, making up 53.1% of the population. In comparison, Internet penetration in
the US was at 87.9% and in India 34.4% (Internet World Stats, 2017). There is a risk that the demo-
graphic imbalance can have implications for the level of self-censorship, as it is plausible that some
groups are more likely to self-censor than others, a point to which we return in our estimates of the
individual level characteristics of self-censorship (see also Jiang and Yang, 2016, for their discussion
of the variability of self-censorship). Despite limitations with regards to generalizing to the larger
population, evaluations of web-based and crowd-sourcing samples have found that participant pools
are much more diverse than other samples of convenience such as university students (Buhrmester,
Kwang and Gosling, 2011). Further, our sample is geographically much more representative than
are prior studies of political fear in China. While Jiang and Yang (2016); Lei and Lu (2017) and
Stockmann, Esarey and Zhang (2017) conduct studies in Shanghai, Sichuan province, and Beijing
respectively, our sample consists of observations from all Chinese provinces with a mix of rural and
urban respondents (see Appendix 5 for the geographical distribution of respondents).
In democratic countries it has been shown that web-based data collection is more likely than face-
to-face interviews to elicit truthful responses to sensitive questions (Heerwegh, 2009; Holbrook and
Krosnick, 2010). Rather than reporting a response to an enumerator, who in the case of academic
surveys in China is often connected to a state-run university, respondents have the security of
recording answers on their own personal devices in a place and time of their choosing with no
oversight of an interviewer. On the other hand, web-based surveys in China may not provide the
same level of respondent security; censorship of the Internet is so extensive that respondents may
be more likely to falsify preferences given that they know that the Internet is monitored. While the
7For exact wording see survey question number 21, and 31 in Appendix F
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Table 1: Study sample comparison to Internet users and a representative sample
Study Participants Internet Users WVS 2012 sample
Gender Male 49.9% 53% 50.8%
Female 49.9% 47% 49.2%
Other 0.21% - -
Region Northeast 6.1% 10.1% 8%
Coast 68.7% 46.2% 40%
Central 12.9% 22.1% 25.6%
West 12.2% 21.5% 26.4%
Income <= 50,000 (60,000) 9.8% 71.2 -
50-100,000 (60-100,000) 36.1% 11.9% -
>= 100,000 47.8% 8.4% -
No income or no response 6.3% 8.4% -
Education Primary or below - 14.3% 25.4%
Junior Secondary 2.46% 37%
63%
Senior Secondary 11.87% 28.2%
Junior College 22.16% 8.9%
11.6%
University or above 63.21% 11.5%
Age <= 19* 1.1% 23%
21.8%
20 - 29 34.1% 30.4%
30 - 39 43.2% 24.2%
46.2%
40 - 49 17.1% 13.4%
50 - 59 3.7% 5.3%
32%
>= 60 0.08% 3.7%
Note: Internet user data from The 38th Statistical Report of Internet Development in China (July 2016).
Region data from the 37th edition (January 2016). World Values Survey data from Wave 6 (2012).
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primary function of online censors has been to remove content deemed inappropriate by the regime,
and only as tool to identify political opponents upon repeated attempts to coordinate collective action
(King, Pan and Roberts, 2013), there has been a shift in recent years towards a larger emphasis on
identifying influential social media users who challenge the Party’s hegemonic position (Miller and
Gallagher, 2018).
While we are careful to avoid any claim that our sample is representative, it is a random sample
from the market research firm’s population which allows us to generalize to this segment of the Chi-
nese population. Further, 81% of our sample conforms to the definition of Netizens - the segment of
the Chinese population that gains information primarily from online sources rather than traditional
media. Pertinent to this study, it is well-known that Netizens are more openly critical of the gov-
ernment than are other segments of the population which might make them less likely to self-censor
(Lei, 2011). Nevertheless, given our unique sample and web-based data collection, it remains unclear
how far these findings can be generalized beyond the market research firm population. While this is
a valid concern, the strength of this study is in its experimental design; that is, while the external
validity of the study may be low, it has high internal validity.
We present a descriptive comparison of our sample with a representative sample of Chinese In-
ternet users and a World Values Survey sample (intended to be nationally representative, conducted
with face-to-face interviews) in Table 1. The primary di↵erence between our sample and the sam-
ple of Internet users is in education level and income, our sample being wealthier and more highly
educated. Di↵erences in age result because we restricted our data collection to only individuals
above the age of 18, and di↵erences in region are likely a reflection of the need to start the survey
during o ce hours in Eastern China where the market research firm is located. Therefore, while we
have observations from every single Chinese province, the Eastern provinces are overly represented
in relation to population size. Our sample is descriptively very similar to other web-based samples
in China (see Huang and Yeh, 2017; Truex, 2014).
4 Design and Estimation
We conduct four list experiments to test four di↵erent aspects of regime support. As we argue above,
these four measures represent two distinct dimensions of political support - di↵use support which
represents system/institutional support, and specific support for the current leadership (Easton,
1965). Our measures of di↵use, system support include belief that the current system of government
is better than others, and support for the government’s right to censor the media in order to prevent
political instability. We did not include measures of support for individual actors such as President Xi
Jinping to investigate support for current leadership as we deemed such statements unlikely to pass
online censors. Further, such action would be unethical towards our local partners as they, rather
than we, would be subject to any eventual consequences (Lu, 2016). Rather, in order to estimate
specific support for current leadership we use measures of confidence in the national government and
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belief in the sincerity of an ongoing anti-corruption campaign. The latter is particularly salient as it
has been a primary, and highly publicized, policy of Xi Jinping’s rule, and was recently rea rmed
at the latest National People’s Congress in March 2018.
The four lists are presented below in Table 2. Each list contains five statements with the
sensitive item of interest in bold; the statements are arranged in the order in which they were
presented to respondents. To minimize the risk that respondents would learn the purpose of the
exercise we intentionally varied the positioning of the item of interest in the lists, and chose control
list items that were broadly political or social in nature so that the item of interest did not appear
too conspicuous. Lastly, to avoid ceiling and floor e↵ects - when a respondent agrees with all or
none of the statements thereby exposing their true preference to the sensitive item and invalidating
the list experiment - we followed Glynn (2013) and designed the lists to contain at least two items
that negatively correlate. We conducted two pilot studies to evaluate and adjust our lists so that
ceiling and floor risks would be minimal. From the full distributions of responses for each of the
four experiments our approach was successful (see Table 6 in Appendix A). The low number of
respondents in the lowest and highest categories should alleviate any concerns about ceiling and
floor e↵ects.
In order to ensure the anonymity of responses, individuals are asked to state the number of
items from the list with which they agree, but are not asked to identify any specific item. The
control group received a list with four statements, all of those excluding the item of interest in
bold, and the treatment group received the full list of five statements. Therefore, the only di↵erence
between the treatment and control versions was the presence of the sensitive statement of interest
for the corresponding list. The response field was a numerical drop-down list from 0 to 5 (0 to 4 for
the control groups) so providing a non-numerical answer thereby revealing a preference for a given
statement was not possible. It is possible that additional items on the lists, such as “Overall, the
country is going in the right direction”, are sensitive in the Chinese political context, but because
the same items are presented to the control and treatment group, the potential sensitivity of any
additional item does not invalidate the results.
The survey included several demographic items such as gender, age, level of education, income,
ethnicity, region and city, hukou status, occupation, primary source of information, party member-
ship, and number of children. We further asked for information about parental education and party
membership, as well as three measures of authoritarian personality (for the full survey see Appendix
F). We use this information to identify individual characteristics that are likely to induce preference
falsifying behavior.
4.1 Design
The experiment was conducted with two-stage randomization. First, we created two blocks each
containing two treatment and two control lists. Block 1 contained treatment lists Confidence and
Censorship and the control lists System and Corruption. Block 2 reverses the order and contained the
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Table 2: The List Experiments
Confidence
Generally speaking, most people cannot be trusted.
We should focus less on the economy and more on the environment.
The government is like a parent and should tell us what to do.
I have confidence in the national government.
The government is the employee of the people and should do things according to the wishes of
the people.
Corruption
Air pollution is one of the most important problems in our country.
Overall, the quality of life was better 30 years ago.
Overall, our country is going in the right direction.
The government is doing its best to crack down on corruption and root out bribery.
Economic progress is more important than protecting the environment.
System
It is important to follow religious norms and ceremonies.
Private ownership of business should be increased.
Our system of government is better than any other that I can think of.
Women make equally good political leaders as men.
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
Censorship
People can only get rich at the expense of others.
The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things
that might be politically destabilizing.
I consider myself capable of participating in politics.
It is reasonable for students to pay tuition for university education.
The economic situation of my family was better a few years ago than it is today.
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treatment lists System and Corruption, as well as the control lists Confidence and Censorship. The
blocks were designed such that each block contains one di↵use and one specific support treatment
list. Random assignment determined which block respondents received. Each respondent therefore
is both in the treatment group for two items and control group for two others. The second-stage
was to randomize within the blocks themselves; the order in which the lists were presented to
respondents was randomized so as to avoid any potential priming e↵ects that may have arisen from
being presented with a treatment (or control) list first.
Figure 1: Design
Block 1 
• Confidence Treatment 
• System Control 
• Corruption Control 
• Censorship Treatment 
Block 2 
• Confidence Control 
• System Treatment 
• Corruption Treatment 
• Censorship Control 
Direct Questions 
• Confidence 
• System 
• Corruption 
• Censorship 
Full Sample 
An alternative experimental design would have been to separate the sample into five groups, one
control and four treatment groups - a separate group for each of our four sensitive items of interest.
This set-up is known in the literature as the “multiple treatment” design (Blair and Imai, 2012).
However, to maximize statistical power, we chose to present all four lists to all respondents thereby
treating each list as an independent experiment of the “standard” design. Priming is mitigated by
randomizing the order in which the lists are presented to respondents so our results cannot be said
to be confounded by having received a particular treatment (control) list first.
All respondents were then asked the four sensitive items directly. Using Confidence as an exam-
ple, they were asked, “Do you agree with the following statement, ’I have confidence in the national
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Table 3: Treatment and control lists by block
Block 1 Block 2
Confidence Treatment Control
Corruption Control Treatment
System Control Treatment
Censorship Treatment Control
government.’” and presented with the options, “Yes”, “No”, or “Do not know”. Responses to these
questions are the basis for our estimates of support using the direct technique. The order of presen-
tation of these four questions was also randomized, but all respondents received them immediately
after responding to the list questions.
While it has been common in the application of list experiments to pose the direct question to a
separate control group only (one which does not receive any list), or to ask of only the control-list
group, asking the direct question of all respondents has two primary benefits. The first is that
estimates of the direct item are made with greater precision, and the second is that information for
all respondents is required for statistical analysis of the underlying assumptions behind the design
(Blair and Imai, 2012; Aronow et al., 2015). The main risk with asking a treated individual a
direct question in our application is potential priming e↵ects. These are easy to diagnose; if being
presented the treatment list primes one to respond a certain way to the direct question, treatment
status should correlate with outcome of the direct question. We find however no evidence to suggest
that this is the case for any of our four sensitive items (see Appendix B). Priming not being an
issue, we retain our full sample in the analysis of all direct items.
4.2 Estimation
Estimates of regime support using the indirect questioning method are made by calculating a simple
di↵erence-in-means between the treatment and control groups. As respondents state the number of
items from a list with which they agree, the overall mean values of the control and treatment groups
for a specific item can theoretically di↵er by a maximum of 1 as this is the di↵erence in the number
of items with which they are presented. As such, the di↵erence in means between the two groups is
the best estimate of the proportion of individuals in the treatment group that answered a rmatively
to the extra item, the treatment statement8. To determine the extent of self-censorship, we compare
this estimate with those from the direct questioning method. Any statistically significant di↵erence
between the two point estimates is evidence of self-censorship as we assume that responses to indirect
questioning are more representative of truthful preferences than are responses to direct measures.
For all direct questions respondents were given the options “Agree”, “Do not agree”, or “Do not
know/Do not wish to say”. We code all that agree as 1 and the two alternative responses as 0. Our
estimates are therefore the proportion of all respondents that agree with the given statement. This
8Appendix Table A provides the full distribution of responses for each of the experiments.
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provides more conservative estimates of self-censorship than if we were to have excluded “Do not
know” answers, but it is more consistent with the wording of the list experiments and subsequently
more appropriate for comparison.
Table 4: Summary Statistics
n mean sd min max range DKs DK %
Gender 1953 1.5 0.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 8 0.4
Education 1953 5.5 0.9 3.0 7.0 4.0 0 0.0
Income 1953 2.5 0.8 1.0 4.0 3.0 124 6.3
YearBirth 1953 1983.4 8.4 1939.0 2000.0 61.0 6 0.3
Ethnicity 1953 1.2 0.9 1.0 8.0 7.0 3 0.2
Hukou 1953 1.1 0.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 5 0.3
Children 1953 1.8 0.6 1.0 5.0 4.0 23 1.2
PartyMember 1953 1.7 0.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 24 1.2
SourceInformation 1953 3.7 0.8 1.0 5.0 4.0 0 0.0
FatherEducation 1953 4.2 1.3 1.0 8.0 7.0 0 0.0
FatherParty 1953 1.7 0.5 1.0 3.0 2.0 21 1.1
MotherEducation 1953 3.8 1.3 1.0 8.0 7.0 12 0.6
MotherParty 1953 1.9 0.4 1.0 3.0 2.0 6 0.3
ConfidenceDirect 1953 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 125 6.4
SystemDirect 1953 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 259 13.3
CorruptionDirect 1953 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 98 5.0
CensorDirect 1953 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 139 7.1
ConfidenceTreat 948 3.9 1.1 1.0 6.0 5.0 1 0.1
SystemTreat 1005 3.6 1.1 1.0 6.0 5.0 4 0.4
CorruptionTreat 1005 3.7 0.9 1.0 6.0 5.0 2 0.2
CensorTreat 948 3.4 1.0 1.0 6.0 5.0 0 0.0
5 Results
The di↵erence-in-means calculations are presented in Table 5 - Column 1 identifies the statement
of interest, Column 2 is the proportion in agreement with the direct questioning method, Column
3 reports the proportion in agreement with the indirect questioning method, and Column 4 is the
di↵erence in the two proportions. A quick glance at the fourth column makes it readily apparent
that falsification is present in all four of our survey items; direct questioning is a biased method of
estimating regime support in China.
Considering confidence in the central government first, for the direct measure, 85.2% of respon-
dents reported that they agreed with the statement, “I have confidence in the national government”.
This figure is consistent with the World Values Survey - 84.6% of Chinese respondents in the 2010-
2014 wave having reported confidence in the national government - but much less than the 94% that
reported “trust” in the national government in the 2011 wave of the Asian Barometer. In contrast,
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according to the indirect method when the same statement was provided in a list, only 66% of in-
dividuals reported agreement; a di↵erence of 19% which is statistically significant. Based on a 95%
confidence interval, the estimated range of falsification is from 10% to 28% of respondents.
Table 5: Estimates of regime support: Direct and indirect questioning
Direct Indirect Di↵erence
Confidence 0.852 0.659 -0.194***
(0.008) (0.044) (0.047)
n = 1953 n = 1948
Corruption 0.849 0.629 -0.221***
(0.008) (0.038) (0.04)
n = 1953 n = 1951
System 0.592 0.435 -0.157***
(0.011) (0.045) (0.049)
n = 1953 n = 1949
Censorship 0.649 0.45 -0.199***
(0.011) (0.044) (0.047)
n = 1953 n = 1948
Standard errors in parentheses
Moving on to the corruption measure, 85% of our respondents agree that the government is doing
its best to root out corruption. 63.1% of respondents in the 2005-2008 Asian Barometer believed
that the government was doing “something” or “its best” to crackdown on corruption, but this was
estimated several years before Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign was started. We suspect that
the introduction and high level of publicity that the campaign has received may be responsible for
the diverging estimates. Being so closely associated with President Xi may have also increased the
perceived sensitivity.
Again the point estimates from the indirect technique are substantially lower than the direct.
Only an estimated 63% of respondents agree with the statement, a 22 percentage point di↵erence.
This estimate, along with all others, is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level indicating
strong evidence of self-censorship. The range of falsification for this item based on 95% confidence
intervals is 13% to 29% of respondents.
In calculating preference for the system of governance in China, 59.2% of respondents agreed with
direct questioning that the current Chinese system was the better than any other they could think
of9. This is somewhat less than the 73.5% of the 2005-2008 Chinese Asian Barometer respondents
agreed or strongly agreed that “Whatever its faults, our form of government is still the best for
us”, but not drastically so. The 2011 Wave posed the question in the following manner, “Compared
to other systems in the world would you say our system of governance works fine as it is, needs
minor change, needs major change, or should be replaced?”, to which a similar 71.8% of respondents
9The non-response rate for this item was 13.1% which may account for some of this di↵erence.
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believed that the system needed only minor change or works fine. For this measure as well we find
evidence of substantial self-censorship when comparing direct and indirect estimates. Only 43.5%
are estimated to believe that the Chinese system of governance is the best with indirect questioning,
a di↵erence of 15.7%. The range of falsification for this item based on 95% confidence intervals is
5.7 to 25 percentage points.
For our final sensitive item, support for government censorship, we find that 65% of our sample
states that they believe the government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing
potentially destabilizing remarks. This is somewhat higher than in a representative sample collected
in 2011; in Wave 3 of the Mainland China portion of the Asian Barometer, respondents were asked
to state their preference of two statements, “The media should have the right to publish news
and ideas without government control”, and “the government should have the right to prevent
the media from publishing things that may be politically destabilizing”. Only 45% of respondents
believed that the government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing potentially
destabilizing remarks, however 13.3% chose a neutral response and a further 3.6% chose not to
answer the question - a strong indication of sensitivity. Among those that did provide a response,
54% believe that censorship is acceptable which is much closer to the estimate from our sample.
We find a similar degree of self-censorship regarding government censorship as we do for the
other sensitive items in our study. The indirect point estimate of 45% is a full 20 percentage points
lower than the direct method estimate, and is again highly statistically significant. The range of
falsification based at the 95% confidence interval is 11% to 29% of respondents.
To summarize, we find strong evidence of self-censorship for all four of our sensitive items, the
extent of which ranges from 16 percentage points (System) to 22 percentage points (Corruption).
These results are represented graphically as well in Figure 2. The sensitive statements in both
direct and indirect form run along the y-axis, and the proportion of respondents in agreement with
the given technique from 0 to 1 along the x-axis. Line type and shape discriminate between the
four items; Confidence (dots with solid lines); Corruption (squares with long dashed lines); System
(triangles with short dashed lines); Censorship (Xs with dashed lines). For each item and method
the estimated proportion is shown with points, and the 95% confidence interval is represented by
the corresponding vertical lines. The much larger confidence intervals that are reported in the
indirect questions is a reflection of the comparative imprecision of the list experiment technique.
Nevertheless, the di↵erences are so large that there is no overlap in confidence intervals for any of
the items.
5.1 Who Falsifies?
In order to determine individual characteristics which lead one to self-censor, we examine the dif-
ference between fitted values of the indirect and direct techniques by subgroup with the inclusion
of demographic control variables. We examine income, education, age, gender, party membership,
urban or rural hukou (household registration) status, and respondent’s belief in who commissioned
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Figure 2: Point estimates with confidence intervals by item and technique
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the survey (government or not). In each case we divide the sample into two subgroups based on the
median value of the characteristic of interest. We then estimate fitted models of the likelihood of
answering a rmatively to the list item while controlling for the remaining variables, and similarly fit
a multiple regression model of the likelihood of answering a rmatively to the direct question item.
For example, in the case of income, we create two subgroups - high and low income as defined by
the median level of income - and estimate models while controlling for age, education, gender, party
membership, urban or rural hukou, and government or non-government commission separately for
each group. In the case of education, we create sub-samples based on the median level of education,
and estimate separate models with controls for income, age, gender, party membership, urban or ru-
ral hukou, and government or non-government commission. We do this for all 7 variables of interest.
Multiple regression estimates of the list items are conducted using the List package in R as outlined
by Blair and Imai (2012). Estimates of the direct item are done with logistic regression. After fitting
the models by subgroup, we then calculate the di↵erence between estimated support by the indirect
method and estimated support by the direct method of questioning. This di↵erence is our measure
of self-censorship by subgroup while controlling for the remaining variables. Any di↵erence in the
amount of self-censorship between the two subgroups is evidence that the characteristic that defined
these two particular subgroups is relevant in determining self-censorship.
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We develop a priori hypotheses of our expectations of the characteristics that should lead one
to self-censor and falsify their survey responses. Our guiding premise is the notion that preference
falsification should be practiced to a greater degree by those that have more to lose (Kuran, 1997;
Jiang and Yang, 2016). This leads us to predict that we should find greater falsification among the
wealthy and the higher educated based on the fact that they have greater economic resources at
stake. Further, we should expect those with urban hukou (household registration) status to falsify
to a greater extent than rural hukou because of the design of the Chinese social system. Specifically,
all state-funded social services such as education and health care are available to citizens in the
locality of their hukou only. Therefore, if one is registered in a di↵erent locality from where one
currently resides, they must travel to their hukou locality in order to gain access to state-funded
services, or pay for private services in the locality in which they reside. This system further creates
an urban/rural divide as the extent of public services in cities is far greater than in rural regions;
those that live in cities have access to government services that are simply unavailable to rural
residents. This includes better schools for children and access to health care facilities not available
in poor and sparsely populated areas. As a result, we predict urban residents should show a greater
likelihood to self-censor.
A similar logic can be applied to party members. Beyond access to the political apparatus,
members also have access to economic benefits such as jobs. As such, one should expect greater
falsification among party members. However, it is possible that those that seek membership in the
party are to a greater extent than non-members believers in the system. Less self-censorship among
members may be the result of high levels of support in both the direct and indirect methods of
investigation.
With respect to age our premise of resource loss does not directly apply with control for other
background factors. We would nevertheless expect older respondents to falsify more because of
their lived experience of more repressive periods of CCP rule such as the cultural revolution and
Tiananmen square protests (see eg Jiang and Yang, 2016). However given the relatively young
sample that a web-based survey produces it is not clear that there is su cient variability in age for
this relationship should materialize.
We expect to find gender based di↵erences in falsification such that women should self-censor
to a greater extent than men. Risk-aversion theory argues that women are in general more risk
averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), and should as a result be more likely to avoid the
unnecessary risk of criticizing the regime in an academic survey. Further, as in many countries there
are gendered di↵erences in economic and labour market outcomes in China. As systemic forms of
discrimination imply that women typically need to work harder than men in order to gain the same
economic standing, one may expect them to be more cautious of that standing in line with our
resource loss premise.
Lastly, in relation to who one believes to have commissioned the survey, we would expect that
those that believe the government commissioned the survey to falsify more. Note that we specifically
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informed respondents before beginning the survey that the work was being conducted on behalf of an
independent, foreign university. Holders of this belief may be inherently untrusting of the government
and therefore less likely to take the risk of expressing disapproval. On the other hand, individuals
that believe that the government is responsible for the survey may falsify to a lesser extent if they
consider such government-sponsored questioning as a signal that the expression of such beliefs is
pre-approved. That is, one may believe that if one was not allowed to express lack of support for
the government, the government would not provide one with the opportunity to do so. This line of
reasoning would also help to explain the results found in Lei and Lu (2017) that respondents are
more critical of the government when the enumerator is a CCP member rather than a university
researcher. Those that believe that an independent research institution was responsible for the survey
may rather choose to “play it safe” and over-report their support due to an inherent uncertainty
over where the threshold of sensitivity truly lies, which would result in greater falsification among
this group.
Figure 3 reports the estimated di↵erence between these two questioning techniques by subgroup
for the all of the four items: confidence in the national government; belief in the sincerity of an
ongoing anti-corruption campaign; preference for the existing system of government; and support
for government censorship.10 The points represent estimated proportions and the horizontal bars
the 95% confidence intervals. At a glance, most subgroups appear to practice self-censorship to a
similar extent with regards to all four items, but there are exceptions.
Age defines the first two subgroups (born before 1985 - our sample median - or after), and here
we see that there is tendency among younger respondents to self-censor to a higher degree than do
older respondents. The pattern appears for three out of the four items, although the di↵erences
between the groups are not statistically significant. This is contrary to our expectation but again,
the relatively young sample that we have may explain this divergence between observation and
expectation. An possible alternative hypothesis is that younger respondents have more knowledge
of the state’s online reach, causing them to self-censor to a larger extent than older respondents,
who may feel more secure about their anonymity online.
Party membership, the second subgroup, is distinctly irrelevant in determining falsification. This
result is somewhat surprising as we may have expected a di↵erence between the two groups, but
when controlling for other characteristics this is not the case. This may be due to the fact that
the party actively recruits the wealthy and highly educated (Dickson, 2007) such that falsification
may be the result of these factors rather than party membership per se. Indeed, when controls are
excluded from the estimates of support for censorship up to 26% of party members falsify whereas
only 18% falsify among non members. Further, party members are significantly more likely than
non members to support censorship in direct questioning stating on average 6% greater likelihood
of explicit support. While this is not a vast di↵erence between the two groups, it does nevertheless
indicate that party members hold more regime sympathetic views than do non members among
10For reference Appendix 4 plots subgroup di↵erences for estimates from the direct questions.
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Figure 3: Self-censorship by subgroup for each list item
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our sample when controlling for other factors such as income, education, gender, and hukou status.
While personal benefits such as access to jobs undoubtedly factor in for some in the decision to join
the party, political support nevertheless remains as a significant factor.
Education is not relevant in determining self-censorship in China for all items, but it is in relation
to support for government censorship, the dashed lines with Xs. Given that we have a web-sample
we do not find substantial variation in education. As such, we have defined our subgroups as those
that studied at the Bachelor’s level or above and those that studied junior college or below. With
regards to censorship, the higher and lower educated are predicted to have the same levels of support
in direct questioning, the di↵erence observed here between levels of falsification is rather the result
of lower true levels of support for censorship among the university educated than among those that
studied to the junior college level or lower. With direct questioning 66% of the lower educated and
65% of the higher educated are predicted to support censorship. However, a large di↵erence appears
when estimates are made with our indirect list experiment. In this case, while 53% of the lower
educated are predicted to support censorship, only 40% of the higher educated do so. The di↵erence
between the direct and indirect methods for the university educated is nearly twice as large as that
of the lower educated (-0.25 and -0.14 respectively) which suggests that education is relevant in
determining preference falsification of censorship, even among our highly educated sample. This is
consistent with prior work (see Jiang and Yang, 2016), but it is unclear if this is a linear relationship
or if university education is decisive.
Gender also appears to be a factor in determining the level of self-censorship, with women showing
a greater propensity to falsify their responses. Each of the four items show this tendency, albeit it
is only the estimates for preference for the existing system of government, short dashed line with
triangles, for which confidence intervals show no overlap. These results confirm our prior expectation
that women should falsify more than men.
Those with urban hukou (household registration) are more likely to falsify their preferences than
are those with rural hukou, similarly supporting our prior expectation. This is true for three out of
the four lists. Moreover this di↵erence is substantial with a di↵erence in the propensity to self-censor
of 31 percentage points with regards to preference for the existing system of government, dashed
line with triangles, and 25 percentage points, for support for government censorship, dashed line
with Xs. This result is consistent with Li (2004) who found that rural residents are willing to openly
criticize the regime. However, the sharp di↵erence we find between rural and urban residents calls
into question the validity of the assumption that many researchers have subsequently made based
on this finding - that open criticism of the regime among rural residents is indicative of a lack of
self-censorship generally in China. Urban residents are, according to our estimates, the most likely
of any sub-group to self-censor. Predicted values from our multiple regression models show that a
large majority, a full 78% of respondents, state that they support censorship in direct questioning,
whereas only 43% are estimated to support the practice if asked indirectly. The di↵erence between
rural and urban residents arises through di↵erences in the level of support with indirect questioning
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- that is, true preferences. A similar proportion of rural to urban residents support censorship with
direct questioning, 75% and 78% respectively, but with 64% of rural residents stating support with
the indirect question compared to 43% of urban residents, it can be concluded that a substantially
larger portion of rural residents support authoritarian rule than do urban residents.
Income level defines the next two subgroups, and as predicted we see that there is some di↵erence
between high and low income earners, yet neither di↵erence is significant. With direct questioning
87% of high income earners state that they that believe Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is a sincere
e↵ort to root out corruption whereas 83% of low income earners share this sentiment. However,
this di↵erence is the manifestation of self-censorship by the wealthy rather than true di↵erences in
belief. Using indirect questioning the level of belief in the campaign is substantially smaller for both
groups, and in fact smaller among the high-income earners.
Lastly, respondents that believe that the government commissioned the survey appear to be
less likely to falsify with regards to two of the four items than are those that believe that an
independent research institute (or other organization) commissioned the survey. For confidence in
the national government, long-dashed line with squares, the relationship is reversed, and with regards
to preference for the existing system of government, dashed lines with triangles, belief about survey
sponsor is distinctly irrelevant in determining self-censorship. These results are therefore consistent
with our “signal” hypothesis in that individuals may believe that if the government gives the option
to disapprove it is not a risk to do so. These results are consistent with Lei and Lu (2017)’s findings,
but they also show that their finding that individuals are more critical of the government to a CCP
enumerator cannot be viewed as evidence that self-censorship on surveys does not exist.
6 Conclusion
The study of authoritarian regimes has long used survey data to determine the extent, causes, and
consequences of popular support for non-democratic rule. Implicit in this approach has been the
assumption that respondents are willing to express their true opinions with respect to political topics.
In order to test this assumption we apply a technique often used to overcome social desirability bias,
the list experiment, to the study of self-censorship in China.
We study self-censorship in relation to four politically sensitive survey items: confidence in the
national government; belief in the sincerity of an ongoing anti-corruption campaign; preference for
the existing system of government; and support for government censorship. We find that self-
censorship is present and substantial for all four of our sensitive items; 16-22% of respondents that
state regime support in direct questioning in fact hold regime-critical opinions. In spite of the
presence of extensive self-censorship, this study nevertheless finds that the Chinese regime does in
fact enjoy popular support in relation to the current leadership - that is, the regime enjoys specific
support. A majority of respondents express confidence in the national government and believe
that the current anti-corruption campaign - a flagship policy of the President Xi - is a sincere
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attempt to root out graft. A large proportion of respondents are less than forthcoming in direct
questioning which exposes these measures of regime support to self-censorship as well. But estimates
with indirect questioning nevertheless show that a substantial majority, 66% and 63% respectively,
support the regime with these measures.
Estimates of di↵use support for more long-standing, system-level institutions of CCP rule are
however substantially less flattering to the regime. While direct questioning shows that a majority
of respondents support the regime even with these measures, indirect questioning shows that true
levels of support are much lower. In particular, we ask if respondents agree that their system of
government is “better than any other I can think of” and that the government “should have the
right to prevent the media from publishing things that might be politically destabilizing”. 60% and
65% of respondents agree with these two statements when asked directly, but only 44% and 45% do
so when asked indirectly. While support for the current leadership may help to o↵set any potential
negative consequences of such low institutional support in the short term, any eventual failure on
the part of leadership may present problems for the regime given that it is lacking support for more
enduring features of its rule.
We also investigate the individual-level characteristics associated with self-censorship and show
that falsification of survey responses is most prevalent among the wealthy, younger, female, and
urban respondents of our sample. Falsification among these subgroups however occurs in two dif-
ferent manners. The wealthy do not di↵er from the less-wealthy in their true beliefs, but they do
claim to support the regime more with direct questioning. Urban residents on the other hand hold
substantially less favorable regime friendly views with indirect questioning than do rural respon-
dents, which indicates that this factor is related to anti-authoritarian attitudes. However, increased
self-censorship among the urbanites in direct questioning gives the appearance that hukou status is
not a significant factor in determining regime support in China.
Lastly, using direct measures women di↵er only marginally from men, but are considerably more
critical of the regime than men when measured with indirect techniques. Women do falsify more
than men, which may be the result of the fact that true support is so low that it a↵ords greater
opportunity to falsify. Alternatively, like in most countries, women in China su↵er from asymmetrical
labor market outcomes and gender-based wage penalties. As such it may be the case that they are
more likely than men to self-censor because they face more obstruction in obtaining favorable social
and economic positions and are therefore more risk averse to losing such status.
We argue that our sample, though not representative of the wider population, does allow for
generalization to China’s online population and in particular, netizens. Even in the potential absence
of self-censorship among the population as a whole, the results here are nevertheless relevant to
the literature which studies the individual-level factors related to regime support. We find that
falsification is most prevalent among the wealthy, the young, urban, and female respondents, which
means that cross-sectional studies of the individual characteristics of regime support in authoritarian
regimes are likely invalidated by this systematic bias in response sincerity.
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This study provides a significant contribution to the literature in two respects. First, it con-
tributes to a nascent literature which has begun to di↵erentiate between expressed and true opinions
in authoritarian regimes. In terms of political attitudes these are often thought to be one and the
same which is often - but not always - the case in democracies. However, this literature has begun to
demonstrate that this assumption does not hold in nondemocratic contexts. Related, the more direct
contribution of this study is to raise the issue that survey research in China and other authoritarian
regimes may be more subject to self-censorship than was previously thought. As such, results from
previous research that claim extraordinarily high popular support for the Chinese regime must be
re-considered if results from this study are to be replicated on a larger scale.
Given that this study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to estimate the extent of self-
censorship in an authoritarian regime of these measures of institutional and current leadership
support, the results here necessitate further study of these and theoretically related survey items.
This is particularly prudent given the extensive use of such items in cross-national research due to
their presence in international survey projects such as the World Values Survey and the various
Barometer studies. Further, research needs to be done to replicate these findings both with a wider
sample in China and other contexts, with di↵erent measures of political attitudes, and with di↵erent
survey techniques, which will give us a better understanding of the extent of the problem and how
to overcome it.
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A Frequency distributions
Table 6: Frequency distributions of responses for each the experiments
# Confidence System Corruption Censorship
Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
0 17 8 19 20 8 11 44 22
1 150 83 194 132 158 81 248 151
2 489 241 408 331 520 256 415 323
3 268 340 268 313 238 477 260 311
4 77 217 59 158 24 159 33 122
5 N/A 58 N/A 47 N/A 19 N/A 19
Table 7: Proportion of responses for each the experiments
# Confidence System Corruption Censorship
Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
0 0.02 0.008 0.02 0.02 0.008 0.01 0.04 0.02
1 0.15 0.09 0.2 0.13 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.16
2 0.49 0.25 0.43 0.33 0.55 0.26 0.42 0.34
3 0.27 0.36 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.48 0.26 0.33
4 0.08 0.23 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.13
5 N/A 0.06 N/A 0.047 N/A 0.019 N/A 0.02
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B Priming E↵ect Estimates
Table 8: E↵ect of Treatment Status (Group) on Direct Question
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) 1.80⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤ 1.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.83⇤⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15)
Group  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.14
(0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10)
AIC 1636.81 2640.39 1657.42 2528.63
BIC 1647.96 2651.54 1668.57 2539.79
Log Likelihood -816.40 -1318.19 -826.71 -1262.32
Deviance 1632.81 2636.39 1653.42 2524.63
Num. obs. 1950 1950 1950 1950
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
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C Balance Table
Table 9: Balance Table - Mean Values by Block
Block 1 Block 2
Gender 1.51 1.49
Education 5.43 5.44
Income 2.52 2.55
YearBirth 1983.73 1983.18
Ethnicity 1.16 1.24
Hukou 1.12 1.10
Children 1.85 1.85
PartyMember 1.71 1.70
SourceInformation 3.72 3.62
FatherEducation 4.17 4.17
FatherParty 1.70 1.69
MotherEducation 3.76 3.77
MotherParty 1.85 1.86
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D Subgroup Analysis
Figure 4: Support by Subgroup - Direct Technique
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E Geographical Distribution
Figure 5: Geographical Distribution of Respondents
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F Full survey - English (Chinese version available upon re-
quest)
Introduction
Thank you for your participation! This is a political science survey overseen by Professor Sven Oskarsson as the
primary researcher for which Uppsala University is the principal organizer.
Your participation makes a valuable contribution to academic research. It is therefore important that you read all
questions closely and answer them truthfully. If you prefer to not to respond to a question, please choose the alter-
native “prefer not to answer”. Completing the questionnaire should take approximately 10 minutes. Participation in
this survey is voluntary and unauthorized persons will not be given access to your responses. If at any time you wish
to quit the survey you may do so by navigating away from this site or closing your browser window.
If you wish to participate please click Next below. If you do not wish to participate please navigate away from this
site or close your browser window.
Sven Oskarsson
Department of Government
Uppsala University
sven.oskarsson@statsvet.uu.se
[University logo]
1. Which year were you born? [roll down list]
2. Gender: [Man/Woman/Prefer not to answer]
3. What is your ethnicity? [Han/Mongol/Manchurian/Hui/Tibetan/Zhuang/Other/Prefer not to answer]
4. In which region of China do you live? [roll down list]
5. In which city or town do you currently live? [blank box]
6. What is your current hukou status? [Urban/Rural/None]
Condition: if None is selected: Skip to end of block
7. Do you have hukou in the city or town where you currently live? [Yes/No]
8. What is your highest level of education? [No education/Primary school/Junior high school/High school (in-
cluding secondary school)/Junior College/University Bachelor/Master and above/Other]
9. What is your annual income in Chinese Yuan? [Below 50.000/Between 50.000 and 100.000/Between 100.000
and 200.000/Above 200.000 yuan/Prefer not to answer]
10. Are you working for the government or public institution, for private business or industry, or for a private non-
profit organization? [Government and state-owned enterprises and institutions/Private enterprises/Private
non-profit organizations/Not working/Prefer not to answer]
11. Do you have any children? [0/1/2/3/3 or more/Prefer not to answer]
12. What is your political a liation? [Member of the Party (CCP)/Not a member/Prefer not to answer]
13. What is your main source of information? [Radio/TV/Print newspapers/The Internet (including mobile)/Other]
14. What is your father’s highest level of education (including currently enrolled)? [No education/Primary school/Junior
high school/High school (including secondary school)/Junior College/University Bachelor/Master and above/Other]
15. What is your mother’s highest level of education (including currently enrolled)? [No education/Primary
school/Junior high school/High school (including secondary school)/Junior College/University Bachelor/Master
and above/Other]
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16. What is your fathers political a liation? [Member of the Party (CCP)/Not a member/Prefer not to answer]
17. What is your mothers political a liation? [Member of the Party (CCP)/Not a member/Prefer not to answer]
18. How much do you agree with the following statement, Even if parents demands are unreasonable, children
still should do what they ask. [Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Somewhat agree/Strongly agree/Dont
know/Dont wish to say]
19. How much do you agree with the following statement, Being a student, one should not question the authority
of ones teacher. [Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Somewhat agree/Strongly agree/Dont know/Dont wish
to say]
20. How much do you agree with the following statement, For the sake of the family, the individual should put his
or her personal interests second. [Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Somewhat agree/Strongly agree/Dont
know/Dont wish to say]
21. Here we would like to confirm that you have read all the questions closely. Please select No from the list below,
whether or not it is true for you. Do you think it is has been interesting to participate in this survey? [Yes/No]
List experiments: How many of the above statements do you agree with? (items in bold only
presented to treatment group, see figure 1)
22. Confidence
Generally speaking, most people cannot be trusted.
We should focus less on the economy and more on the environment.
The government is like a parent and should tell us what to do.
I have confidence in the national government.
The government is the employee of the people and should do things according to the wishes of the people.
23. System
It is important to follow religious norms and ceremonies.
Private ownership of business should be increased.
Our system of government is better than any other that I can think of.
Women make equally good political leaders as men.
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
24. Corruption
Air pollution is one of the most important problems in our country.
Overall, the quality of life was better 30 years ago.
Overall, our country is going in the right direction.
The government is doing its best to crack down on corruption and root out bribery.
Economic progress is more important than protecting the environment.
25. Censorship
People can only get rich at the expense of others.
The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that
might be politically destabilizing.
I consider myself capable of participating in politics.
It is reasonable for students to pay tuition for university education.
The economic situation of my family was better a few years ago than it is today.
Direct questions
26. Do you agree with the following statement, I have confidence in the National Government? [Yes/No/Prefer
not to answer]
35
27. Do you agree with the following statement, The government doing its best to crack down on corruption and
root out bribery?? [Yes/No/Prefer not to answer]
28. Do you agree with the following statement, Our system of government is better than any other that I can think
of.? [Yes/No/Prefer not to answer]
29. Do you agree with the following statement: The Government should have the right to prevent the media from
publishing things that might be politically destabilizing. [Yes/No/Prefer not to answer]
30. Who do you think has commissioned this investigation? [The Government or government agency/An indepen-
dent research institute or university/A Private Enterprise/Other/Do not know]
31. This is the last question of the survey and here we would like to confirm that you have read all the questions
closely. Please select No from the list below, whether or not it is true for you. Do you think it is has been
interesting to participate in this survey? [Yes/No]
32. Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Your reply has been recorded. [End]
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